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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
CONSUMER CREDIT-The Department Store Revolving 
Charge Account-Usury Resurrected-State 
v. J.C. Penney Company* 
l. INTRODUCTION 
The Attorney General of Wisconsin recently brought an action 
against the J.C. Penney retailing chain for an injunction against any 
further charges of 1½% per month on the declining balances of 
its revolving charge accounts. The state alleged that anything in 
excess of I% per month was a violation of the $12 per $100 per 
annum usury ceiling established by its legislature as the maximum 
chargeable for a loan or forbearance of money.1 Penney admitted 
that its monthly charge frequently exceeded the allowable rate but 
argued that its charge was a "time-price differential," exempt from 
statutory control under the time-price doctrine.2 The trial court 
rejected this contention. In deciding that the monthly charge in 
fact represented interest on the forbearance of an indebtedness cre-
ated by the sale, the court refused to apply the doctrine, by which all 
but two American jurisdictions have traditionally exempted credit 
sales from the strictures of the usury laws.3 The trial court nonethe-
less refused the injunction on the ground "[t]hat the right to assert 
the violation of section 138.05(1) is a right personal to the persons 
who contract with defendant under . . . [Penney's charge account 
agreement ]."4 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the finding of usury but 
also directed that the in junction be issued on the basis of a finding 
that the defendant's usurious practices clearly constituted a public 
• 48 Wis. 2d 125, 179 N.W.2d 641 (1970). 
1. 48 Wis. 2d at 127, 179 N.W.2d at 642. WIS. STAT. ANN.§§ 138.05(1), .09(9)(a) (Supp. 
1971). Section 138.05(1) provides in part that no person shall 
directly or indirectly, contract for, take or receive in money, goods or things in 
action, or in any other way, any greater sum or any greater value, for the loan or 
forbearance of money, goods or things in action, than: 
(a) At the rate $12 upon $100 for one year computed upon the declining 
principal balance of the loan or forbearance ••. (emphasis added). 
2. 48 Wis. 2d at 129, 179 N.W.2d at 643. For a discussion of the operation of the 
time-price doctrine, see notes 25-29 infra and accompanying text. 
3. Those jurisdictions are Arkansas and Nebraska. See notes 83-85 &: 91-94 infra 
and accompanying text. 
4. 48 Wis. 2d at 130, 179 N.W.2d at 643. The trial court concluded that a viola-
tion of section 138.05(1) "is not a matter in which the state of Wisconsin has any right 
or interest nor does it create any common or public nuisance requiring defendant to 
be enjoined at the instance of the state." 48 Wis. 2d at 130, 179 N.W.2d at 643. It 
should be noted, however, that criminal penalties were available to the Wisconsin At-
torney General. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 138.06(2) (Supp. 1971). 
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nuisance.5 This decision represents more than a minority view on an 
obscure legal technicality. The result resurrects usury laws, which 
had been effectively interred by a history of judicial and legislative 
exceptions to their application. Moreover, it seems probable that 
the decision will have economic impacts adverse to the interests of 
the consumer it purports to protect. 
Under a standard revolving credit agreement, of which the Pen-
ney charge account agreement is representative, the customer may 
pay the cash price of purchases charged to his account, without any 
additional charges, at any time before the second billing date fol-
lowing his purchases. 6 At the second billing date, if the cash price 
is still unpaid, it is added to the unpaid balance in the account and 
the total is subjected to a monthly "service charge," usually of 
1½%-7 Payments are made on the unpaid balance according to a 
schedule of minimum monthly installments, which depend upon 
the size of the debt outstanding. Generally, there is also a limit on 
the total outstanding debt allowable under each account.8 Accep-
tance of this type of agreement by consumers has been attributed to 
several factors: (I) the availability to the customer of a ready fund in 
the amount of the allowable account maximum; (2) the adminis-
trative simplicity resulting from the merger of separate debts into a 
single amount upon which only one monthly payment need be 
made; and (3) the ease with which a customer may maintain a con-
tinuing indebtedness without "repeated sober reappraisals required 
by the difficult and formal contract negotiations that precede every 
normal debt."9 Furthermore, there is evidence that such an agree-
5. 48 Wis. 2d at 155, 179 N.W.2d at 657. Apparently, the state's objective in in-
voking a consumer-protective device-the usury law-was to protect consumers from 
the usurious practice at issue. 
6. 48 Wis. 2d at 135-37, 179 N.W.2d at 646-47. 
7. NATL. RETAIL MERCHANTS AssN., STUDY OF CONSUMER CREDIT COSTS IN DEPARTMENT 
STORES 3 (1963) [hereinafter NRMA STUDY]. All but one of eleven merchants studied 
were charging 1.50% on the monthly charge account balance, and that one converted 
prior to publication of the results. See also Lynch, Consumer Credit at Ten Per Cent 
Simple: The Arkansas Case, 1968 U. !LL. L.F. 592, 596-99. Thus, any accusations that 
the real rate of interest is always in excess of 18.00% per annum are unfounded since 
payment before the second billing date would avoid that result. For an example of a 
particularly inflammatory use of this inapplicable argument, which may have had an 
influence in creating the pressures that brought about the action in the principal 
case, see Boyle, Charges for Revolving Credit and Charge Accounts, Subject for 
Scrutiny, Wisconsin Supervisor Suggests, 12 PERS. FIN. L.Q. REP. 33 (1958). In fact, in an 
arrangement like Penney's, in which no finance charge is assessed during the first 
thirty days of account activity nor for the month in which the customer pays the 
account balance in full, the real interest rate will more closely approximate 14.00%. 
In a study of fifteen stores offering revolving credit agreements (thirteen accounts at 
1.50% and two at 1.25%), the effective annual rate was 13.60%. Lynch, supra at 597. 
8. For a complete discussion of the account involved in Penney, see 48 'Wis. 2d at 
128-29, 179 N.W.2d at 642-43. 
9. Symposium: Developments in the Law, Part Ill, Revolving Credit, 55 Nw. U. L. 
REv. 330, 331-32 (1960) [hereinafter Revolving Credit]. 
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ment is "usually the cheapest form of consumer credit available to 
the small borrower,"10 and in some instances probably the only form 
available.11 
The popularity and wide acceptance of revolving credit agree-
ments might argue for a result opposite from that reached in 
Penney.12 Nearly every large department store in the United States 
offers revolving credit;13 of these, Penney was the last major retailer 
to succumb to the competitive pressures created by others offering 
it.14 The first such arrangement was introduced by Wanamaker's in 
1938 almost certainly as a simple promotional scheme,15 but it be-
came very popular with consumers as a convenience and, its critics 
argue, with retailers, who found it to be a profitable operation in 
itself.16 If for no other reason than that revolving credit agreements 
have achieved widespread consumer acceptance throughout the 
United States, the logic and rationale of the Wisconsin court's de-
cision to invalidate Penney's credit agreement deserves scrutiny. 
II. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL AVOIDANCE OF USURY LAws 
Usury laws, derived almost exclusively from ecclesiastical sour-
ces,17 have come to be viewed as 
blunt instruments of social control. Unrefined and clumsy, they are 
also ineffective. They not only fail to accomplish their purpose, but 
produce harmful side effects as well. Without escape valves, the effect 
of these laws would have been devastating. Even with escape valves, 
they do more harm than good.18 
IO. Revolving Credit, supra note 9, at 334. 
11. If loans were available for the same purposes as revolving credit agreements 
are, the problem of high interest rates connected with the latter would likely disap-
pear. The purchaser would simply pay off his charge account balance in time to 
avoid the service charge with money borrowed from lenders at nonusurious rates. 
12. Indeed, the Wisconsin supreme court took judicial notice of the "widespread 
use of the revolving charge account and of the large number of Wisconsin citizens 
affected by these practices," but did so only to conclude that such practices were 
pervasive enough to support a finding of a public nuisance. 48 Wis. 2d at 155, 179 
N.W.2d at 657. 
13. Revolving Credit, supra note 9, at 332 n.14. 
14. s. MARGOLIUS, THE INNOCENT CONSUMER vs. THE EXPLOITERS 54 (1967) (Pcnney°s 
was "traditionally a cash store"). 
15. Revolving Credit, supra note 9, at 330-33. 
16. See notes 69 & 70 infra and accompanying text. 
17. See generally Frierson, Changing Concepts on Usury: Ancient Times Through 
the Time of John Calvin, 7 A?.r. Bus. L.J. 115 (1969). Authors have traditionally cited 
the passages from Ezekiel 18:13: "He has lent on usury; he has taken interest; he 
shall surely not live •••• He shall surely suffer death; his blood is upon him"; and 
Deuteronomy 23:19-20: "Thou shalt not lend upon usury to thy brother •••• " Until 
the time of Calvin, whose reinterpretation of traditional Christian dogma against 
lending money for interest had a tremendous impact on the rapidly e.xpanding 
economies of Western Europe during the seventeenth century, any taking of interest, 
no matter how small, constituted usury. Id. at 123-24. 
18. Shanks, Practical Problems in the Application of Archaic Usury Statutes, 53 
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Several reasons generally are proffered for the inadequacy of usury 
laws. First, in a truly competitive market, in which supply and de-
mand force loan interest rates above the arbitrary ceiling of the 
statute, the prospective lender need only use another mode of in-
vestment to realize the higher rate of return; second, since interest 
rates on consumer loans are those that most often conflict with the 
maximum rates set out in usury statutes, the persons most likely 
to be denied the power to purchase are those the law purports to 
protect; and third, only the legitimate lender is deterred from 
charging interest above the statutory ceiling, whereas the unscrupu-
lous lender is encouraged to charge even more than he would nor-
mally be inclined to ask, since he must hedge against the added risk 
factor of being found in violation of the statute.19 
The persuasiveness of the above arguments has occasioned the 
repeal of all usury laws in France, England, and Massachusetts.20 
Where such laws are still in effect,21 however, the harsh consequences 
of statutory interest ceilings are being ameliorated by periodic 
amendments and legislative exceptions each time new commercial 
exigencies manifest themselves.22 The result, in most states, is a 
pastiche of legislation, which by its own complications betrays the 
ad hoc character of its development.23 In addition to providing 
higher maximum rates, the legislatures have facilitated creditors' 
efforts to circumvent the usury laws by authorizing special charges 
and discount methods to increase the effective rate of interest, by 
VA. L R.Ev. 327, 329 (1967). The author maintains that this is the "generally accepted 
[view of] all serious students on the subject." Id. at 330. 
19. Id. at 330. 
20. Id, at 330. Shanks attributes the demise of the usury laws in these jurisdictions 
to A, Turgot's Memoire sur les Frets d'Argent (1769); Jeremy Bentham's Letters in 
Defense of Usury (1787); and to Richard Henry Dana's Address in the House of Rep-
resentatives of Massachusetts, Feb. 14, 1867. Id. at 330-31. He acknowledges that similar 
efforts failed in Virginia, and in Congress when the repeal of the District of Columbia 
usury statute was soughL Id. at 331. See also Are Charges for Revolving Credit Sub-
ject to the Usury Laws?, CONF. ON PERS. FIN. LAW, PROGRAMS AND PAPERS iv (1958) 
[hereinafter PROGRAMS AND PAPERS]. 
21. In the United States, all but three states-Maine, Massachusetts, and New 
Hampshire-presently have usury laws. B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT U:GIS• 
LATION 140-43 (1965). See also l CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 1J 510, at 1301-07 (1971). 
22. See generally Benfield, Interest Ceilings and the Uniform Consumer Credit 
Code, 56 A.B.A.J. 946 (1970). 
23. Illinois, for instance, has an installment loan act (ILL. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 
74, §§ 51-77 (Smith-Hurd 1966)); an installment loan rate {ILL, R.Ev. STAT. ANN. ch. 
74, § 4a (Smith-Hurd 1966)); a consumer finance act (ILL. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 74, §§ 19-
46 (Smith-Hurd 1966)); a revolving loan and credit law (ILL. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 74, 
§§ 4.1-.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971)); an insurance premium financing law {ILL, REv. 
STAT. ANN. ch. 73, §§ 1065.60-.68 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971)); a motor vehicle install-
ment sales act (ILL. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 121½, §§ 561-86 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971)); 
and an "other goods" installment sales act (ILL. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 121½, §§ 501-33 
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971)). Each of these acts has a different maximum rate. 
1372 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 69 
reducing penalties for violations, and by eliminating the defense of 
usury for corporate borrowers.24 
One area in which legislatures have generally not been forced to 
enact a loophole is that of "time-price" or "credit" sales, where a 
judicially created rule, the time-price doctrine, has traditionally 
been called upon to justify the exemption of su,ch sales from the 
requirements of usury laws. The time-price doctrine seems to have 
had its origin in the 1827 case of Beete v. Bidgood.25 The Court of 
the King's Bench, distinguishing between interest charges on loans 
and higher prices for deferred-payment sales of property,26 held that 
a seller may offer an article at two different prices, a cash price and 
a credit or time-price. The rule came to be recognized that it is 
immaterial if a time-price exceeds the cash price by more than the 
statutory allowance for interest on a loan in the amount of the cash 
price for the same duration.27 The foremost American statement of 
the rule, from the United States Supreme Court, illustrates its 
primary "logic": 
A vendor may prefer $100 in hand to double the sum in expectancy, 
and a purchaser may prefer the greater price with the longer credit; 
[and one who will not distinguish between things that differ must 
say, with apparent truth, that B (purchaser) pays a hundred per cent 
for forbearance, and may assert that such a contract is usurious; 
but whatever truth there may be in the premises, the conclusion is 
manifestly erroneous.] Such a contract has none of the characteristics 
of usury; it is not for the loan of money, or forbearance of a debt.28 
A previous Wisconsin decision had also adopted this reasoning.20 
Another explanation for the exemption of credit sales from the 
strictures of the usury laws is primarily historical. When usury stat-
24. Shanks, supra note 18, at 332-33. 
25. 7 B. & C. 453, 108 Eng. Rep. 792 (K.B. 1827). 
26. The court noted that confusion sometimes arose because when a prospective 
seller quoted two prices, one for immediate sale and one for deferred sale, the dif-
ference was called "interest." 7 B. & C. at 458, 108 Eng. Rep. at 794. See also B. CURRAN, 
supra note 21, at 13-14. (The Curran book is divided into two sections, one for legisla-
tion regulating lenders and one for legislation regulating vendors.) 
27. See Annot., 14 AL.R.3d 1065 (1967). 
28. Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 115, 119 (1861) (brackets added). This pas-
sage, except for the bracketed portion, was quoted by the Wisconsin supreme court in 
Penney. 48 Wis. 2d at 141, 179 N.W.2d at 649. 
29. The penalties and prohibitions of the [usury] statute are aimed at the re-
ceiving or contracting to receive a greater rate of interest than that prescribed by 
it upon the loan or forbearance of money, or other things, and do not apply to 
the sale of a note or any other vendible commodity, which, when in good faith 
intended as such, may be sold and transferred for such price as may be fixed by 
agreement of the parties. The only limitation upon this principle, if it may be 
pro:perly so called, is that made necessary for the purpose of giving effect to the 
spint and intent of the law against usury by preventing the parties from resorting 
to the fonn as a cloak to cover for what is in reality a usurious loan. 
Otto v. Durege, 14 Wis. 621 623-24 (1861). 
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utes were first enacted, installment or credit buying was virtually 
unknown; it was a device normally associated with the purchase of 
luxuries, so that those partaking of its benefits were not at all the 
persons whom the usury laws were designed to protect.30 This 
reasoning, somewhat modernized, is still compelling for many in the 
twentieth century who support the exemption of credit sales: "[A] 
purchaser is not like a needy borrower, a victim of a rapacious 
lender, since he can refrain from the purchase if he does not choose 
to pay the price asked by the seller."31 Some have attributed the 
preferential treatment for the seller to the fact that his time-price 
differential may include compensation for the increased risk of a 
credit sale.32 Another possible explanation is the presumption in-
dulged that natural competition among sellers in the market place 
will protect buyers from exorbitant credit charges.33 Finally, the 
exemption has been attributed to the fact that usury laws run con-
trary to the general policy of freedom of contract and therefore 
were not to be extended absent a clear-cut legislative mandate.34 
III. THE PENNEY DECISION 
The Wisconsin supreme court subjected Penney's revolving credit 
arrangement to a factor analysis35 with a view toward determining 
30. Warren, Regulation of Finance Charges in Retail Instalment Sales, 68 YALE 
L.J. 839, 842-43 (1959). 
31. Gen. Motors Accept. Corp. v. Weinrich, 218 Mo. App. 68, 78, 262 S.W. 425, 433 
(1924). Typical of the shroud beclouding usury decisions is the fact that commenta-
tors have called the rationale espoused in Weinrich obsolete for exactly opposite rea-
sons. In Revolving Credit, supra note 9, at 336-37 n.32, this argument is called un-
realistic today because the great preponderance of all credit, whether extended to a 
borrower or a purchaser, is used for luxuries, so that neither is in need of credit. 
Another author calls the Weinrich view "manifestly anachronistic" today because one 
can purchase on credit with the same amount of need as the borrower: "If the usury 
laws were designed to protect weak and needy persons from the overreaching of 
economically superior renters of capital, then it should be recognized that the bargain-
ing position of instalment buyers may be as disadvantageous as that of borrowers of 
money." ·warren, supra note 30, at 843. See also NRMA STUDY, supra note 7, at 3; Com-
ment, Retail Credit Sales and Usury, 24 LA. L. R.Ev. 822, 839 (1964) ("The equality 
of bargaining power between vendor and vendee assumed by the common law is 
~a!dly r~stic in motor vehicle sales as automobiles are frequently considered neces-
sities .••• ). 
32. Comment, supra note 31, at 824-25. This would seem to be a doubtful assertion, 
since it is a poor assumption that any lender would overlook the same factors con-
sidered by sellers as a cost component in evaluating his income possibilities; in fact, 
it would seem that a lender risks the total amount loaned (unless the loan was dis-
counted), whereas the true risk to a vendor who makes a 50% markup on goods sold 
is only half as much, i.e., his costs. Perhaps the more critical factor behind this 
preferential treatment is that of a "general hostility to usury statutes by bench, bar 
and business." Id. at 826. 
33. Revolving Credit, supra note 9, at 336. 
34. Note, Judicial and Legislative Treatment of "Usurious" Credit Sales, 71 HARV. 
L. R.Ev. 1143, 1145 (1958). 
35. See 48 Wis. 2d at 144, 179 N.W.2d at 651, in which the supreme court repeated 
the trial court's "detailed analysis of factors." 
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whether in substance, as well as in form, a time-price sale, and not a 
loan or forbearance in the sense of the usury law, was involved.36 
The court concluded that the revolving credit plan involved a "for-
bearance" within the meaning of the statute37 such as would justify 
a finding of an "implied loan" in the circumstances. The court had 
thereby determined that the plan contained the elements necessary 
for finding a transaction usurious.38 The opinion side-stepped the 
traditional view that a sale of property, involving no prior debt, 
cannot involve a loan or forbearance of money39 and merely held 
that "[c]learly the trial court is correct when it concludes that the 
purchase of goods creates an obligation to pay for them."40 The 
Penney court's rationale was that to allow deferred payment on this 
obligation is enough to constitute a forbearance in substance, since 
all that would be necessary for a forbearance in form would be the 
addition of the words "[t]his debt becomes due and payable in 
thirty days from the date of purchase" to the credit agreement.41 
Such an insignificant formality, the court held, should not be con-
trolling.42 
36. 48 Wis. 2d at 141-42, 179 N.W.2d at 649-50 (citing Otto v. Durege, 14 Wis. 
621, 623-24 (1861)). 
37. See note I supra. 
38. The elements of a usurious transaction in Wisconsin are typical. In Zang v. 
Schumann, 262 Wis. 570, 55 N.W .2d 864 (1952), the court listed them: 
The definition of usury imports the existence of certain essential elements gen-
erally enumerated as (I) a loan or forbearance, either express or implied, of 
money, or of something circulating as such; (2) an understanding between the 
parties that the principal shall be repayable absolutely; (3) the exaction of a 
greater profit than is allowed by law; and (4) an intention to violate the law. 
262 Wis. at 579, 55 N.W .2d at 868, quoting 55 AM. JUR. Usury § 12, at 331 (1946). 
Since the second and third elements were found in Penney, 48 Wis. 2d at 133, 179 
N.W .2d at 645, and since the court upheld the trial court's finding of an implication 
of the fourth element because the contract on its face imported usury, 48 Wis. 2d at 
150, 179 N.W.2d at 654-55, only the first element was at issue. 
39. This fact has been recognized in the opinions of the Wisconsin Attorney 
General, who observed that "most courts hold that a debt must be due before there 
is a forbearance." 54 OP. WIS. Arrv. GEN. 235, 245 (1965). The opinion, requested by 
the Commissioner of Banks, involved the question of whether revolving charge ac-
count plans "constitute loans or forbearance subject to the provisions of the usury 
statutes, or whether all or any one of them qualify as time sales under the 'time price 
doctrine.' " Id. at 235. The opinion noted the view in Arkansas where the word "for-
bearance" has been held to mean simply "that the person to whom the money is 
owed waits for all or part of the money after the consummation of the contract in 
which money is involved, or that the seller foregoes payment in cash and waits for all 
or part of his money.'' Id. at 245. Cf. Sloan v. Sears, Roebuck &: Co., 228 Ark. 464, 308 
S.W .2d 802 (1957). 
40. 48 Wis. 2d at 135, 179 N.W.2d at 646. 
41. 48 Wis. 2d at 136, 179 N.W.2d at 646-47. 
42. 48 Wis. 2d at 136, 179 N.W.2d at 647. Two other jurisdictions, Arkansas and 
Nebraska, have used the same logic to conclude that while not properly a "loan," a 
credit transaction necessarily involves a "forbearance," under contract, from collect-
ing a debt when due. Lloyd v. Gutgsell, 175 Neb. 775,782, 124 N.W.2d 198,203 (1963); 
Sloan v. Sears, Roebuck &: Co., 228 Ark. 464, 467, 308 S.W.2d 802, 804 (1957). For a 
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The second thrust of the Wisconsin supreme court's analysis went 
to the requirement commonly used to defeat the protection of the 
time-price doctrine in installment sales situations, that of requiring 
a "bona fide" time-price. In some jurisdictions credit sales, no longer 
ipso facto exempt, are presumed to be subject to the usury laws un-
less it can be demonstrated that two prices, a cash price and a time-
price, were quoted to the prospective buyer. There must be a clear 
and obvious pre-sale disclosure of the total obligation.43 Since under 
a revolving charge account the ultimate time-price to be paid by the 
purchaser is incalculable,H this factor, strictly applied, would suffice 
to expose such plans to the usury laws. Another factor cited by the 
Penney court as preventing a finding of bona fide time-price sale was 
the similarity of a revolving charge account to a so-called "open ac-
count."41i The periodic percentage charges added to the outstanding 
balances of open accounts have been held subject to the usury laws 
because such "running" accounts can involve multiple purchases.46 
More importantly, however, the court pointed out that the revolv-
ing charge is uniquely vulnerable to the two-price test because, unlike 
an installment sale contract, the revolving charge agreement can be 
made before any specific sale is even contemplated;47 both the cash 
general discussion of the Nebraska and Arkansas treatments of time-price or credit 
sales, see B. CURRAN, supra note 21, at 83-90. 
43. Revolving Credit, supra note 9, at 338. The Penney court cited Lee v. Peck-
ham, 17 Wis. 394, 398 (1863), for the proposition that courts will look through the 
form to the substance of an agreement alleged to be usurious. 48 Wis. 2d at 137, 179 
N.W.2d at 647. This trend of looking through the "form" to the "substance" in a 
bona fide sale is discussed in Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 1065, 1070 (1967). The earliest use 
of this approach was probably made in Seebold v. Eustermann, 216 Minn. 566, 13 
N.W.2d 739 (1944). See also McNish v. Grand Island Fin. Co., 164 Neb. 543, 83 N.W.2d 
13 (1957); Hillmann's v. Em 'N Al's, 345 Mich. 644, 77 N.W.2d 96 (1956); G.F.C. Corp. 
v. Williams, 231 S.W .2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950). For the Hogg formula for a bona 
fide time-price sale, see note 28 supra and accompanying text. 
Neither the forbearance approach nor the bona fide time-price (and concomitant 
two-price requirement) approach to holding time-price arguments invalid is to be con-
fused with the holdings in cases in which arrangements are found to be merely dis-
guised loans or "schemes or devices" to avoid the usury laws. These decisions are 
common to virtually all jurisdictions having a usury statute. See generally E. FARNS-
WORTH & J. HONNOLD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL LAW 1111-27 (2d ed. 1968). 
44. Jordan &: ·warren, Disclosure of Finance Charges: A Rationale, 64 MICH. L. 
RI;v. 1285, 1306 (1966). See also PROGRAMS AND PAPERS, supra note 20, at 47-66. But it 
has been pointed out that although most installment sales contracts contain provisions 
for options to prepay, for default and delinquency charges, and for the possibility of 
refinancing, such contracts have not fallen prey to the two-price requirement. Revolv-
ing Credit, supra note 9, at 338-39 n.40. 
45. 48 Wis. 2d at 146, 179 N.W.2d at 652. 
46. E.g., James Talbott, Inc. v. Jackson, 137 N.Y.S.2d 416 (Sup. Ct. 1954). 
47. 48 Wis. 2d at 148, 179 N.W.2d at 653. See McNish v. Grand Island Fin. Co., 
164 Neb. 543, 548, 83 N.W.2d 13, 17 (1957). The court in NcNish was also concerned 
that the contract did not differ from one customer to another. 164 Neb. at 547, 83 
N.W .2d at 16. 
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price and the time-price are incapable of computation at this junc-
ture. 
The bona fide time-price requirement, then, is a way to subject 
consumer credit transactions to the usury laws without expressly 
discarding the time-price doctrine. Even in the simplest installment 
sale situation, in which all components of the full time-price have 
been made known to the consumer prior to the sale so that he could 
calculate the total dollars-and-cents obligation if he so desired, the 
contract has been held to lack a bona fide time-price.48 Although it 
is at least arguable that a diligent consumer with sufficient mathe-
matical ability could calculate the time-price of any purchase he was 
about to make,49 it would proba~ly be futile to make even this 
argument. In any jurisdiction adopting this restrictive definition of 
the bona fide time-price, charges for revolving credit in excess of 
statutory limits will fail as usurious. 50 
Finally, the Wisconsin supreme court rejected any attempt to 
justify the 1½% per month as merely a service charge. It quoted 
the trial court's statement that the so-called " 'service charge' is not 
a fixed amount, independent of the amount owed .... [r]ather it is 
a percentage of a balance of indebtedness and is computed 
monthly";51 and further, that there is "no evidence that the cost of 
the service necessary, or expense incident to the operation of the ac-
count, such as bookkeeping, billing, etc. bears any relation to the 
'service charge.' "52 
48. Nelson v. Gen. Credit Co., 166 Neb. 770, 90 N.W .2d 799 (1959); Sloan v. Sears, 
Roebuck &: Co., 228 Ark. 464, 308 S.W .2d 802 (1957); Natl. Bond &: Inv. Co. v. Atkin-
son, 254 S.W .2d 885 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952). This requirement is considered "meaning-
ful" because a "substantial number" of credit buyers prior to making a purchase do 
the calculation necessary to determine the total price they must pay. Note, supra 
note 34, at 1145. 
49. PROGRAMS AND PAPERS, supra note 20, at 40; Revolving Credit, supra note 9, at 
338 &: n.39. 
50. Revolving Credit, supra note 9, at 338. The author points out that any revolv• 
ing charge account plan which could comply with the strict two-price requirement and 
provide a strict "dollars-and-cents time-price" would necessarily lack the convenience 
that has made revolving credit popular and economically feasible. Id. at 338. In fact, 
compliance would seem to be an impossibility if any characteristics of revolving 
credit are to be retained. 
51. 48 Wis. 2d at 147, 179 N.W.2d at 652. The supreme court quoted from Lloyd 
v. Gutgsell, 175 Neb. 775, 782, 124 N.W.2d 198, 203-04 (1963), on which the trial court 
had relied: 
There seems to be an impression that if a cash price is quoted and the buyer is 
unable to pay cash, it is then possible to apply a certain schedule of rates or 
charges to the cash price in order to determine the time sale price • • • • Where a 
time sale price is determined by applying a certain schedule of rates or charges 
to the cash price, the resulting product is interest. This is merely a sale for a cash 
price, with the difference between the money the buyer has and what he needs 
being financed. 
48 Wis. 2d at 147, 179 N.W.2d at 653. 
52. 48 Wis. 2d at 147-48, 179 N.W.2d at 653. See also Friedman v. Wisconsin Accept. 
Corp., 192 Wis. 58, 210 N.W. 831 (1927). This service charge argument is rarely 
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There is one curious omission from the court's attack on the ap-
plicability of the time-price exemption to the present case. It is an 
argument quite often subsumed under the bona fide heading in 
attempts to expose so-called time-price differentials as mere usurious 
loan interest. The argument suggests that if there is a close re-
lationship between the vendor-dealer and a finance agency, the 
rationale for preference to credit sellers disappears, and the sale 
should not be considered one at a bona fide time-price. 53 The trans-
action is treated, in effect, as a disguised loan, on which the "risk 
and delay of deferred payment is borne by an adequately compen-
sated finance company, rather than by the seller himself."54 Since it 
is reported by at least one source that Penney owns its own finance 
company,65 one wonders why, in the deluge of £actors considered by 
the Penney court, this point was left unmentioned. Perhaps the 
courts are £aced with yet another anomaly in the usury area; that a 
close relationship with a finance company can invalidate a time-price 
sale, but the total assimilation of a finance company cannot. 
The Penney opinion need say little more than it does to expose 
sufficiently the illogic commonly expounded in support of the time-
price doctrine. The court succeeds in its objective of looking through 
the form of the challenged plan, but it stops before getting to the 
real substance of the issue presented. The court assumes that the 
time-price doctrine could be applied in some situations and purports 
merely to expose this particular agreement as a sham. In point of 
£act, however, the court's own unassailable logic leads to the inescap-
able conclusion that the entire time-price doctrine is a fiction.56 
pressed in defense of a revolving credit agreement simply because it is so easily de-
feated. See, e.g., Comment, Usury and Revolving Credit: The Old Law and the New 
Economics, 15 S. DAK. L. R.Ev. 304, 309-12 (1970); Revolving Credit, supra note 9, at 
335-36. The argument is commonly invoked only by banks on revolving check credit, 
where because of the absence of any sale aspect, the exemption of the time-price 
doctrine is unavailable. Revolving Credit, supra note 9, at 339. 
53. Revolving Credit, supra note 9, at 339: 
Many department store revolving credit charge account plans are run entirely 
by banks, which contract to establish the account, keep all records, and furnish 
all forms, charge plates, and statements of account. Consequently, sales on such 
plans would not qualify for the exemptions as bona-fide time-sales under this 
view. 
See also Note, supra note 34, at 1146-47. 
54. Warren, supra note 30, at 843-44. 
55. S. MARcouus, supra note 14, at 54. 
56. An analogous line of decisions in Arkansas is illuminating. In a process 
beginning with Hare v. Gen. Contract Purchase, 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d 973 (1952), 
the Arkansas court progressed from the same position Penney adopts to the point of 
admitting that under its decisions "credit sales .•. as distinguished from cash sales 
have just about disappeared." Sloan v. Sears, Roebuck &: Co., 229 Ark. 464, 470, 308 
S.W.2d 802, 806 (1957). It is interesting to note that in Arkansas the usury ceiling is 
a constitutional matter, and the legislature is therefore incapable of rounding its 
troublesome comers. See notes 84 8: 85 infra and accompanying text. 
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There is no analytic, economic difference between a loan and a 
credit sale: 
[C]redit or loan is involved in every exchange in which there is 
delay in completing the transaction. In any case in which the buyer 
does not render payment to the seller upon acquisition of the seller's 
goods or services, the economic reality of the situation requires us 
to acknowledge that the seller is making a loan to the buyer of the 
value of those goods for as long a period as it takes the buyer to 
complete his payments . 
. . . On this principle, we must recognize the unreality of the legal 
distinction between cash and vendor credit.57 
As the Penney court defines forbearance, not even the classic original 
sale hypothesized in Hogg v. Ruffner58 could be a valid time-price 
sale. 
It is similarly unrealistic to make the applicability of the usury 
laws depend upon whether there has been strict compliance with 
a two-price requirement derived from statements of an 1861 case on 
a time-price sale. Although there are good reasons and high motives 
for wanting the buyer to know the true additional dollar costs of 
the privilege of deferred payment before he makes a purchase, it 
seems indefensible that in some jurisdictions no method other than 
a dollars-and-cents total time-price will suffice to achieve these ob-
jectives. Does the fact that the consumer cannot or will not calculate 
the total time-price in advance mean that he must be considered in-
capable of comprehending any other explanation of the import of 
his agreement? Is it not possible to explain that agreeing to a I½% 
monthly service charge is exactly the same as agreeing to pay $101.50 
for a $100 item in thirty days, or $118.00 for it in one year?159 Addi-
tionally, it has been argued that disclosure, though helpful, bears 
no relation to the purposes for which usury statutes were enacted, 
and that it should by no means be adopted as a test for the validity of 
a time-price sale.60 Moreover, to restrict the prospective buyer to a 
57. McEwen, Economic Issues in State Regulation of Consumer Credit, 8 B.C. IND. &: 
CoM. L. REv. 387, 390-91 (1967). 
58. 66 U.S. (1 Black) 115 (1861). See note 28 supra and accompanying text. An 
example of the court's confusion is that it restates "the question" as being "whether 
there is involved here a true credit sale or a charge for a forbearance." 48 ·wis. 2d at 
137, 179 N.W.2d at 647. It is difficult to imagine that the court thinks the two are 
mutually exclusive. The way forbearance is defined by the court, every "true" credit 
sale must involve a charge for forbearance, unless the seller asks no premium for 
allowing delayed payment. It suffices here to note the words of Shanks, supra note 18, 
at 343: "As might be expected, few usury opinions are edifying. One might go further: 
they are not really analytical." 
59. For a discussion of alternative disclosure requirements in existing and proposed 
credit legislation, see notes 102 & 103 infra and accompanying text. 
60. Note, supra note 34, at 1145-46. Furthermore, in the installment credit situa-
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simple two-price option would remove the flexibility he enjoys 
under a revolving charge agreement. He could no longer hope to 
avoid additional charges by early payment. 61 
Worst of all, the primary reasoning behind the two-price re-
quirement is specious. It assumes that a seller will calculate his 
time-price in some manner other than by adding finance and insur-
ance charges to the cash price, since any such calculation shown on a 
contract would subject the agreement to the usury laws for a lack of 
bona £ides. 62 In point of fact, however, courts should be suspicious 
of any other time-price calculations, since the method disallowed is 
the only one the sensible businessman would adopt.63 
The analytical approach taken by the Penney court in defeating 
the exemption from the usury law provided under the time-price 
doctrine by finding no bona fide time-price is new only in that it 
is the first time a court has applied it to revolving charge agree-
ments. When such an analysis was applied by some courts to in-
stallment sales in the late 1950's, it elicited this criticism, which 
seems to be appropriate still: 
In short, these courts look through form not to substance but merely 
to another kind of form. Though proclaiming the time-price doc-
trine, they have made compliance with its strictures infeasible in 
the light of modem instalment-credit practices. If the time-price 
rule should be abolished, direct abrogation is preferable to ham-
stringing the operation of the rule by the creation of arbitrary and 
anachronistic judicial exceptions.64 
Regardless of whether the court's reasoning was correct, its holding 
will have the effect of a renunciation in Wisconsin of the time-price 
doctrine, with the result that charges in excess of I% per month on 
revolving charge accounts will be held usurious. Admittedly the 
court was faced with judicial alternatives that represented little more 
than a Robson's choice: either forgo regulation of this major 
consumer credit practice or subject it to usury laws with adverse 
economic and commercial effects, including the possible discourage-
ment of legitimate practitioners. 65 Although the problems presented 
tion, there are two other problems with the two-price test: first, it reduces the entire 
problem to the fact question of whether the total price was ever discussed, with 
resulting inducement to perjury; second, it makes determinative the issue whether the 
parties intended to be bound to a price arrived at by adding charges to the cash 
price, or to a single price total-a strange rule for a law intended to protect the 
purchaser from his own folly. Id. at 1146. 
61. See text accompanying note 6 supra. 
62. See note 51 supra and accompanying text. 
63. Warren, supra note 30, at 845. 
64. Id. at 849. 
65. Symposium: Developments in the Law-Part I, Limiting Consumer Credit 
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by such credit practices are certainly more amenable to adminis-
trative and legislative evaluation and resolution,66 a court faced 
with the necessity for decision cannot ignore its duty to balance the 
consumers' interests against the need to maintain conditions in the 
consumer credit area that will "encourage financial institutions to 
meet the credit needs of an ever-growing economy."67 As one commen-
tator has pointed out, no matter what the original decision should 
have been with respect to the applicability of usury laws to credit 
sales, the increase in volume and importance of credit since that 
time has greatly changed the factors to be considered.68 It is neces-
sary to strike a balance in evaluating the effects of the Penney de-
cision. 
Assuming for the moment that loan sharks and gougers are un-
able to operate outside the legitimate market, the only arguable 
value of usury laws is control of the excessive credit charge and the 
unconscionable bargain. Thus, in defense of the Penney result any 
evidence that retail chains can reap large profits from credit opera-
tions would be persuasive. Such evidence is not totally absent. It 
has been argued that the mere fact that revolving credit has been 
so "assiduously promoted" by America's large "combined store-
finance companies" means it must be a lucrative business practice in 
and of itself.69 It is reported that one American family in three has 
a Sears credit account, and that Sears does 58%, or 4 billion dollars 
worth, of its sales on credit.70 When it is noted, however, that 40% 
of the 4 billion dollars sold went for "soft goods" like clothing, 
"which families used to buy for cash but now often buy on fee-charg-
ing revolving credit accounts,''71 a different explanation for the rapid 
growth of revolving credit offers itself. Prior to the advent of the 
Charges by Reinterpretation of General Usury Laws and by Separate Regulation, 55 Nw. 
U. L. REV. 303, 315-16 (1960). 
66. Warren, supra note 30, at 851. 
67. Id. at 850. 
68. Note, supra note 34, at 1148. Since this statement was made, the amount of 
total credit outstanding has more than doubled, from $56 billion in 1960 to over $120 
billion in 1969. 56 Fed. Res. Bull. A54, March 1970. 
69. S. MARcouus, supra note 14, at 54. Others are willing to infer high profitability 
from the opposition of the National Retail Merchants Association (NRMA) to the 
federal truth-in-lending legislation as it was to apply to revolving charge accounts. 31 
CONSUMER REP. 470, 472 (1967). But since the original legislative proposal was for a 
disclosure that the annual rate of interest was 18%, perhaps NRMA opposition can be 
traced to other grounds. As previously noted, the effective annual interest rate is 
computed to be considerably less than 18% in the typical revolving charge arrange-
ment. See note 7 supra. 
70. S. MARcouus, supra note 14, at 54. One indication of this aspect of the phenome-
nal growth of revolving credit is that Sears now does approximately as much of its 
credit-sales volume on revolving charges as on installment contracts used for large 
purchases such as household appliances. Id. at 55. 
71. Id. at 54-55. 
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revolving charge account practice, the consumer was frequently 
unable to get credit or loans for small items because of the excessive 
charges necessarily involved.72 Perhaps, then, the growth of revolving 
credit can actually be attributed to the fact that it filled a vacuum 
in consumer credit relations and became a prerequisite to successful 
competition in retail marketing.73 
On the question of whether 1½% per month is in fact an ex-
cessive charge for the service and thus a justifiable target for the 
controls of usury laws, few reliable data are available. It is com-
mon, however, to find commentators who are persuaded that the 
great retailers, with their "captive" finance companies, are "selling 
debt," with the merchandise as a mere come-on to the real money-
maker.74 These arguments should probably differentiate installment 
credit from revolving credit since the areas of substantial profit seem 
to be installment-sale dominated;75 further, there is evidence that 
ratios of revenues to costs from credit operations for revolving charge 
accounts are lower than for installment sales.76 Additionally, the 
results of ~vo National Retail Merchants Association (NRMA)-spon-
sored studies render any contentions of exorbitant profits derived 
from revolving credit agreements at least questionable. A 1963 study 
covering eleven department store chains and eighty stores found that 
for the average active revolving charge account total credit costs ex-
ceeded revenues from service charges ($13.64 as opposed to $11.82, 
respectively),77 a deficiency amounting to about 1.31 % of the value of 
total credit sales.78 A 1969 study indicated that under present de-
72. Small loans necessitate higher interest rates to maintain a profit margin. It is 
a common practice then to allow higher interest rates on such loans if the lender obtains 
a special license. 1 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE ,I 540, at 1601-35 (1971). 
73. Vendor-customer relations in the use of the open account have presented 
several problems over the years: inability of many cash customers of a store to 
qualify for its regular account service; ••• high credit costs resulting from low 
volume of purchases, multiple payments and collection efforts; and the general 
difficulties of administering credit limits in retail stores. Search for the solution 
to these problems led to the development of revolving and optional accounts. . . . 
[T]he "revolving" account was conceived as a combination of the open and the 
installment accounts. 
R. BART£1.'l, CREDIT MANAGEMENT 156 (1967). 
74. Comment, supra note 52, at 309-12. See also H. BLACK, Buy Now, PAY LATER 
lll-16 (1961); s. MARGOUUS, supra note 14, at 64. 
75. NRMA STUDY, supra note 7, at 7. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. Costs in this context include new account costs, account serv1cmg costs, 
account collection costs, interest at 6% on accounts receivable investment (cost of 
capital), credit space and equipment costs, additional sales persons cost resulting from 
giving credit, and management costs. Id. at 4-5. One third of all costs constituted cost 
of capital figured at 6% of accounts receivable investment (which, the authors maintain, 
is conservative, 15% being more likely), one fourth constituted collection costs, and 
one fourth constituted servicing costs. Id. at 14, 17. It should also be noted that the 
same study finds a virtual break-even balance in the conventional installment account, 
with average revenues of $17.27 and average costs of $17.25. Id. at 7. 
78. Id. at 19 (Ex. IV). 
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partment store credit practices, costs of extending credit average 
22% of outstanding balances, and therefore that an annual interest 
rate at that level would be required to reach the break-even point 
on credit dealings.79 Consequently, evidence of high profitability 
and the excessive nature of 1½% service charges seems insufficient 
to provide confident support for the Penney court's decision to ex-
pose revolving charge accounts to the control of the Wisconsin usury 
laws. 
To be sure, if the time-price doctrine were applied to exempt 
the monthly finance charges of revolving charge accounts from usury 
laws, there would be nothing except competitive forces to prevent 
retailers from increasing such charges,80 and the present state of 
"competition" has failed to satisfy some observers that the consu-
mer's interests are being protected even now.81 Inasmuch as finance 
charges for such accounts have become frozen at 1½% nationwide,82 
however, this argument should carry little weight in opposing the 
application of the time-price doctrine to protect these charges. The 
conclusion must be that if there are excessive profits in revolving 
charge accounts at that rate, they have not been demonstrated to 
exist, nor were they ever invoked by the Penney court in its analysis. 
To be balanced against the possible argument of high profitability 
of revolving charge accounts for retail chains are the probable 
effects that the artificially low interest ceiling of usury laws will have 
on the economic climate in Wisconsin for both consumers and 
businesses. Inasmuch as one state, Arkansas, has experienced such 
effects, scholars are not to be relegated to speculation concerning 
their nature. In Sloan v. Sears, Roebuck & Company,83 the Arkansas 
supreme court held that charges on credit sales in excess of the cash 
price are interest within the meaning of the state's usury law. It is 
possible that this strict approach is traceable to a unique provision 
in the state constitution: "[A]ll contracts for a greater rate of interest 
than ten per cent per annum shall be void, as to principal and in-
terest and the General Assembly shall prohibit the same by law."8' 
79. NATL. RETAIL MERCHANTS AssN., ECONOMIC CHARACI'ERISTICS OF DEPARTMENT STORE 
CREDIT 42 (1969). See also Lynch, supra note 7, at 596-99. 
80. See Boyle, supra note 7, at 67. 
81. See Revolving Credit, supra note 9, at 337, which makes the argument against 
totally "unhampered competition" and in favor of requiring disclosure of rates, because 
"eagerness for ready credit has rendered the modern buyer less cautious about the 
terms." 
82. See note 7 supra. 
83. 228 Ark. 464, 308 S.W .2d 802 (1957). 
84. ARK. CONST. art. XIX, § 13. The compliance of the legislature with this mandate 
can be found at ARK. STAT. ANN. § 68-603 (1957). Perhaps this provision explains the 
Wisconsin Attorney General's description of the Sloan opinion: "[T]he court went 
so far as to state that no contract could carry a charge of more than ten per cent per 
annum simple interest." 54 OP. WIS. ATTY. GEN. 235, 245 (1965) (emphasis added). 
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But whatever the reason, all credit sales arrangements in Arkansas 
are now limited to 10% per annum without exception.85 
An empirical study of the Arkansas experience subsequent to 
the Sloan case was funded by the American Bar Foundation and 
undertaken by the Board of Student Editors of the University of 
Illinois Law Forum. Its conclusions could have been anticipated. 
First, the standards for availability of credit in Arkansas were re-
markably more stringent than those in Illinois, with many an Arkan-
sas borrower who would be considered "an average if not a good" 
credit risk in Illinois being denied credit at home.86 As a result, some 
otherwise reputable lenders were willing to risk engaging in usurious 
loans to those "good" credit risks excluded from the market by the 
stricter Arkansas standards, and community opinion began to ques-
tion the wisdom of the Arkansas usury statute.87 Furthermore, it was 
well-documented that the Arkansas usury law ceiling was not pre-
venting imaginative lenders from realizing more than the amount 
loaned by virtue of disreputable peripheral practices.88 The study 
also substantiated the major assumption that retailers would recoup 
credit costs that could not be offset by the permissible finance charges 
with higher cash prices, 89 with the effect that everyone, including 
those who bought for cash, paid the credit costs otherwise payable 
only by credit buyers. This, of course, was an avenue of self-help 
to retailers unavailable to banks and other lenders; the effect of 
85. In Strickler v. State Auto Fin. Co., 220 Ark. 565, 571, 249 S.W.2d 307, 312 
(1952), the court invalidated the Arkansas Installment Loan Act, Act 203 of 1951, [1951] 
Ark. Acts 472-75 (repealed 1953), a typical small loan law, because in Arkansas "the 
Legislature was powerless to validate the charge." 
86 . .;fo Empirical Study of the Arkansas Usury Law: "With Friends Like That ••• ", 
1968 U. ILL. L.F. 544, 587 [hereinafter Empirical Study]. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 588. Among the practices resorted to were excessive credit insurance 
charges, failure to return prepaid but unearned charges, and illegal flat service charges 
on small loans. "[L]ack of knowledge on the part of the borrower permits the lender 
to use these illegal devices and escape detection. The self-enforcing usury statute does 
not prevent the exploitation of the unsophisticated.'' Id. It may seem anomalous that 
the loan shark, the supposed target of the usury statutes, is the only one who can 
operate effectively when they are enforced. 
89. Id. at 588. Cash prices were 4% to 7% higher in Arkansas than in other states. 
As a part of the same empirical study, a University of Arkansas Professor of Finance, 
Gene C. Lynch, while corroborating many of the study's findings, provided a further 
analysis of the effect of low usury ceilings like those of Arkansas on a vendor's cash 
prices. In a sampling of several large retailing chains, including the J.C. Penney Co., 
it was found that the average cash prices charged in populous areas in Illinois were 
as much as 8½% lower than in neighboring areas in Arkansas. Lynch, supra note 7, at 
599 (Table 9). While conceding that it would be foolish to assume that retailers 
raised their prices in a deliberate attempt to cover credit costs, Lynch concluded that 
the only factor that could logically account for the higher cash prices in Arkansas was 
the strict 10% usury ceiling. The cause of higher prices, he found, was not higher 
absolute costs, but rather lower revenues from credit sales. Id. at 605. The amount of 
the cash price differential was thus seen as a subsidy paid to credit buyers by middle-
and upper-income groups and older people, the traditional cash buyers. Id. at 619. 
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applying the usury ceiling was thus discriminatory as well. The au-
thors concluded that although their study was "not designed to arrive 
at an optimum usury rate, it clearly demonstrates that the present 
Arkansas ten per cent usury rate is truly a malignant benefactor."00 
The decisions of only one other jurisdiction seem to comport 
with that of the Penney case. In a Nebraska case, Lloyd v. Gutgsell,01 
involving an installment sales contract, it was held under the bona 
fide time-price test that "[w]here a time sale price is determined by 
applying a certain schedule of rates or charges to the cash price, the 
resulting product is interest."92 The implications of this holding for 
the fate of revolving charge account plans in Nebraska were clear. 
Subsequent events in Nebraska, if at all indicative of what Wisconsin 
can now expect, may make the Penney result even more frustrating. 
The Nebraska legislature responded to the Lloyd holding by amend-
ing its constitution, 93 and by specifically giving its blessing to 
revolving and installment credit.94 Thus was the law returned to the 
status quo ante. The only possible virtue of the process, if repeated 
in Wisconsin, would be the chance that the legislature, once jostled 
into action, would include in its efforts some more enlightened 
treatment of creditor abuses. 
The courts of one other state have specifically considered the 
applicability of usury statutes to the revolving charge account. The 
Supreme Court of Tennessee, in Dennis v. Sears) Roebuck & Com-
pany,95 opting for a result opposite to that of Penney, chose merely 
to cite the ovenvhelming authority in favor of the time-price exemp-
tion. The court held that the argument made for defining "interest"00 
to include time-price differentials "must be rejected" because "[i]t 
is based solely on grounds that address themselves to the legislature. 
Moreover it is not at all certain that the policy urged on us is the 
best policy."97 It would seem that the Dennis court elected an alter-
native method of stimulating legislative action, one which accom-
plishes the same ultimate result as the Nebraska gymnastics but 
without the embarrassing usurpation of the legislative initiative. 
90. Empirical Study, supra note 86, at 588. 
91. 175 Neb. 775, 124 N.W.2d 198 (1963). See also McNish v. Gen. Credit Corp., 164 
Neb. 526, 83 N.W.2d I (1957). 
92. 175 Neb. at 782, 124 N.W.2d at 204. 
93. Ch. 3, [1963] Neb. Laws Spec. Sess., amending NEB. CoNsr. art. III, § 18. 
94. NEB. R.Ev. STAT. §§ 45-204 to -208 (1968). 
95. 446 S.W.2d 260 (Tenn. 1969). 
96. The appellant had conceded that when the usury provision for the state was 
adopted, it had been the long-settled common-law rule that the term "interest" did 
not apply to the price differential charged on a credit sale, and that at common law 
usury could not occur absent a loan of money or forbearance of a debt. 446 S."W .2d at 
265. To redefine "interest," the court felt, would be unabashed judicial law-making. 
446 S.W.2d at 265-66. 
97. 446 S.W.2d at 265. 
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By eschewing a revolutionary decision in a case like Dennis, 
courts are not necessarily pigeonholing the problem and perpetuat-
ing an unsatisfactory environment for consumer credit. Revolution-
ary decisions like that in Penney would be more defensible, or at 
least understandable, if extensive efforts were not being made to 
solve the problems legislatively. In fact, perhaps the worst possible 
side effect of the Penney holding could be the creation of an impres-
sion in the state legislature that the court's redefinition of usury 
concepts has served the purpose of vindicating the consumer's rights 
and that no legislative refinements are necessary. 
IV. THE APPROPRIATE .ALTERNATIVE 
In accord with the view that consumer credit problems are 
notably ill-suited to judicial resolution under the usury laws, some 
states have already enacted legislation to deal with revolving charge 
plans,08 as they have with installment sales plans; none of these en-
actments require a finance charge to be below 1½% per month. A 
similar bill met with a governor's veto in Wisconsin,99 but perhaps 
that is for the best, since continual legislative patching and mending 
will not suffice to eliminate the anomalies and inconsistencies char-
acterizing consumer credit regulation. A more fundamental restruc-
turing of the applicable statutory framework has been undertaken 
under the aegis of the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws. The product of that effort, the Uniform Con-
sumer Credit Code (UCCC),100 rests on the premise that given true 
competition in the credit industry and given consumers provided 
with information sufficient to enable "shopping" among various 
credit sources, the question of usury would be moot. Theoretically, 
excessive interest charges would be almost impossible. Provisions of 
the recent federal truth-in-lending legislation, which is part of the 
Consumer Credit Protection Act,101 and the UCCC suggest that the 
questions raised by a case like Penney have already been extensively 
analyzed, with results that make the court's decision seem almost 
embarrassingly outdated. First, the kind of disclosure sought under 
both enactments-requiring creditors to compute and divulge the 
"true" annual percentage interest rate-provides the consumer with 
a common denominator by which he can compare credit offers.102 
98. Currently, twenty-five states and Puerto Rico have enacted legislation regarding 
revolving charge plans. See I CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE ,i 520, at 1401-31 (1971). 
99. Wisconsin Bill No. 256 S. See Veto Message of Governor Gaylord Nelson, Oc-
tober 28, 1959. 
100. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE (rev. final draft 1969) [hereinafter UCCC]. 
101. Consumer Credit Protection Act, May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-77 (Supp. V, 1965-1969) [hereinafter CCPAJ. 
102. UCCC §§ 2.301-.313, 3.301-.312. These provisions essentially incorporate the 
federal truth-in-lending requirements. CCPA §§ 121-29, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1631-39 (Supp. V. 
1965-1969). 
1386 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 69 
The Penney two-price disclosure requirement seems simplistic by 
comparison, especially since it ignores the possibility that many 
consumers are unable to compare the time factors involved in pro-
spective interest arrangements. 
Moreover, the framers of these enactments have made it clear 
that the intent of the disclosure provisions is to foster competition 
among credit sellers and thereby "generally force rates below the per-
mitted maximum charges.''103 Competition, it was hoped, would make 
usury law interest ceilings unnecessary to control profits of credi-
tors.104 Although a case has been made for the complete elimination 
of ceilings,105 the Commissioners thought it preferable merely to 
attempt to ensure that competitive factors would keep prices below 
the ceilings established.106 Maintaining some maximum levels for 
interest rates was advocated as a means of preventing the extremely 
necessitous borrower from assuming debt at unconscionable rates. 
It is nonetheless significant that the ceiling established for depart-
ment store revolving credit charges is 2% per month on the first $500 
and 1½% per month on the excess.107 This is an apparent departure 
from the Commissioners' stated goal of according equal treatment 
to all types of creditors, in both sale and loan credit, 108 since the 
Code applies only the lower 1½% ceiling to revolving charge ac-
counts serviced by lenders.109 This exception was made in specific 
recognition of the fact that some smaller stores "are losing money 
at [a finance charge rate of] 18%, and it seems desirable to encourage 
them to use revolving credit at 24% rather than higher rates for 
installment sales.''110 
Most relevant, however, is the commentary from the Commission-
ers on the status of the time-price doctrine in the modem credit 
environment. The Special Committee on Retail Installment Sales, 
Consumer Credit, Small Loans and Usury found itself trying to ex-
103. UCCC § 3.503, Comment 1. As a corollary to the achievement of this goal, 
the UCCC eliminates-except in special cases-the common restrictive practice of 
licensing lenders. See UCCC §§ 3.501-.503. 
104. "[A] rate ceiling is a very imperfect instrument for controlling profits." 
Braucher, Consumer Credit Reform: Rates, Profits and Competition, 43 TEMP. L.Q. 
313, 327 (1970). Professor Braucher was vice president of the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and a member of the special committee re-
sponsible for the UCCC. 
105. Kawaya, The Case Against Regulating Consumer Credit Charges, 5 AM. Bus. 
L.J. 319 (1967). 
106. See Johnson, Regulation of Finance Charges on Consumer Instalment Credit, 
66 MICH. L. REv. 81 (1967), in which it is demonstrated that competition in several 
areas of consumer credit has in fact forced rates well below statutory ceilings. 
107. uccc § 2.207(3). 
108. Braucher, supra note 104, at 318. 
109. uccc § 2.301(4). 
110, Braucher, supra note 104, at 325. 
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plain why it had devoted separate sections with substantially similar 
provisions to credit sales and cash loans: 
[T]he Committee was and is aware that, sociologically and economi-
cally, sales credit and loan credit are alike and that their separate 
treatment results in much duplication in drafting. Nevertheless, we 
are mindful of the weight given to Uniform Acts by Courts of States 
which have not enacted them. Thus, long before the Uniform Com-
mercial Code was enacted or even introduced in New York, the New 
York Court of Appeals relied in part on a provision of the Uniform 
Commercial Code in overruling the Court's prior decisions on privity 
of contract and determining who may recover upon a breach of war-
ranty in a sale of goods. The Committee believes that any encourage-
ment to the courts of a State which has not enacted the Uniform 
Consumer Credit Code to rely on the Code's provisions to reject the 
time sale price doctrine would have most unfortunate social and 
economic consequences for both consumers and credit grantors.111 
The Committee, which spent several years investigating the prob-
lems of consumer credit,112 was willing to duplicate effort, sacrifice 
one of its stated goals, and suffer some pointed criticism113 simply to 
avoid giving even remote encouragement to the kind of decision 
made in Penney. 
It seems strange that the Attorney General of Wisconsin would 
initiate an action, such as that of the Penney case, which would 
compel a decision between such undesirable judicial alternatives.114 
111. UCCC Prefatory Note, at 8 (emphasis added). 
112. Late in the 1950's, a request was received from the Council of State Governments 
to prepare a Uniform Retail Installment Sales Act, but the project was tabled pending 
completion of the CURRAN study, supra note 21. In 1963 the Commissioners appointed 
the Special Committee on Retail Installment Sales, Consumer Credit, Small Loans and 
Usury. Braucher, supra note 104, at 314. 
113. For an example of criticism from virtually within its own camp, see Curran &: 
Fand, An Analysis of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 49 NEB. L. REv. 727, 744 
(1970). 
114. Since "[o]nly a few legislatures have realized the ••• importance of clarifying 
the vague legal status of revolving credit" (Revolving Credit, supra note 9, at 333), 
it was perhaps the aim of the Attorney General to force a showdown with the legis• 
lature in the hope of expediting enlightened legislative treatment. Compare the 
Nebraska experience discussed in text accompanying notes 93 &: 94 supra. An inter-
mittent dialogue among the "Wisconsin principals can be pieced together from 
published materials that shed considerable light on the forces involved in pressing 
this action. See Boyle, supra note 7, at 33. Boyle, the supervisor of the Division of 
Consumer Credit of the state's banking department-and more importantly, the 
state's first small loan supervisor-complained that the Division would have to seek a 
formal opinion of the Attorney General with regard to the legality of the revolving 
credit plans of the large department stores. He explained, inter alia, that the "purpose 
in bringing this to your [the small loan industry's] attention is not because these 
companies are in competition with you, which, however, is true, but more so because 
of the fact that there is no regulation of their operations •••• "Id.at 67. This statement 
casts some doubt on the assumption that the motives behind the action in Penney 
were exclusively consumer-protective. The supervisor's concern seemed to be the likeli-
hood that small loan businesses could not compete with revolving credit vendors, who 
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Once a court is confronted with the necessity of deciding a question 
like that presented by Penney, however, the prevalence of strong 
authority for the economically preferable result should afford some 
deterrence against adopting a minority view with far-reaching reper-
cussions. The time-price doctrine, though a fiction, can now be 
understood to be an amiable one. When viewed in the light of a 
century of judicial and legislative inaction, it could almost be said 
to have been ratified, not because its logical basis is or ever was 
legitimate, but because its effects are those which the legislature 
prefers, or at least has no desire to alter. Notwithstanding its aware-
ness of the logical inconsistencies of the all-but-unanimously ac-
cepted time-price doctrine, a court sensitive to the proper limitations 
of its role in matters of economic regulation should pause to con-
sider the practical effects of its rejection of such a doctrine, especially 
when viable legislative alternatives are available. 
had no comparable licensing requirements. See also Hagen, Credit Sales Under Wiscon-
sin Usury Law, MBA GAVEL, Dec. 1970, at 23; id., Wisconsin Usury Law and the Re-
volving Charge Account, MBA GAVEL, Dec. 1969, at 1. 
